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Trade policy – once a subset of foreign policy far removed from domestic 
concern, focused squarely on border issues and subject to the rules of 
international diplomacy – is now a central concern on the public policy agenda 
as trade issues have become increasingly entwined with traditionally domestic 
policy issues. Consequently, demands have been made for more openness in 
trade policy formation and, in response, many governments have undertaken 
openness initiatives. Despite these developments there has been only a little 
research into the increased openness of trade policy processes in general and 
no research aimed at developing a consistent framework for categorizing 
various openness initiatives and permitting a meaningful comparison of 
initiatives between trading partners. In this paper, the general issue of 
increasing the openness of trade policy is examined, an openness framework is 
proposed and the implications for trade policy are assessed. 
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Introduction 
A 
s trade policy moves from the traditional concerns about border measures such 
as tariffs and quotas to concerns about non-tariff barriers such as regulatory 
standards, it inevitably takes a more central position on the domestic policy agenda. 
Unlike typical domestic policy issues, however, the development, negotiation and 
implementation of trade policy have not been particularly open to citizen engagement. 
Therefore, demands for greater openness
1 of the policy processes related to trade have 
arisen.  
In response to these demands many governments have undertaken initiatives to 
permit increased openness in trade policy processes (Shamsie, 2000; Scholte et al., 
1998; Simmons, 1998). Greater openness may increase public understanding of how 
trade policy decisions are taken in the public interest. For instance, Johnson (2000) 
argued that trade policy makers need to remind the general public that trade 
liberalization sustains economic growth and development; reinforcing this message 
may increase pubic confidence in the credibility and legitimacy of trade policy.  
Yet, while demands for increased openness have been made and, in response, 
some openness mechanisms have been initiated, there has been only a little research 
into the increased openness of trade policy processes in general (Hay, 2000; Wolfe, 
2000; Enders, 1997) and no research aimed at developing a consistent framework for 
characterizing various openness initiatives. Such a framework may be useful in both 
determining when and how openness is actually permitted and in comparing trading 
partners according to their openness mechanisms. This paper examines the general 
issue of increasing the openness of trade policy formation, proposes an openness 
framework and analyzes the related challenges and the implications of increased 
openness for trade policy. 
 
Openness in Trade Policy Formation 
T 
he increased attention surrounding the openness of the trade policy process may 
be attributed to two dynamic forces: first, the increasing complexity of all policy 
issues (domestic and foreign); and second, the increasing domestication of trade 
policy issues.  
With respect to the former, as policy issues become more complicated they 
necessarily become more closed (the issues are no longer easily accessed and assessed 
by the general public but rather require the consideration of experts) and this, in turn, 
raises public concern about openness (Anderson, 1998; Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1990). 
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Consider, for instance, policy issues associated with biotechnology. As a 
transformative technology, biotechnology has been identified as a crucial cornerstone 
to the knowledge-based Canadian economy of the 21
st century (Isaac and Hobbs, 
2002). Yet biotechnology simultaneously expands the information gap that exists 
between the producers and consumers of innovation. In this sense, regardless of how 
open the biotechnology policy process really is, the complication of the policy issues 
decreases public accessibility and increases public concern about openness in the 
process. There is an important lesson implied by this argument: as policy issues 
become more complicated, the traditional methods of openness no longer suffice and 
an increase in policy complication must be met with an increase in policy openness 
just to maintain the traditional level of public understanding. 
Within this context of increasing demands for greater openness due to policy 
complexity, trade policy – a subset of foreign policy – faces an additional layer of 
demands for greater openness due to an increasing “domestication” of foreign policy 
(Johnson, 2000; Stairs, 2000; McCormick, 1998; Milner, 1998; Scherlen, 1998; 
Jensen and Phillips, 1996; Salamon, 1995 and 1994). Stairs (2000) argues that in most 
western, developed countries, public interest in foreign policy has followed a 
predictable path, first focusing on human rights, then on environmental protection and 
now on trade policy as these issues have overlapped domestic policy domains 
traditionally the sovereign jurisdiction of national governments – the so-called 
domestication of trade policy (see also McCormick, 1998). Consider the focus on non-
tariff barriers (NTBs), such as commercial and social regulations. Commercial 
regulations, including laws on intellectual property rights, have come under the scope 
of trade policy as a result of the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-
related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). Controversies 
associated with commercial regulations in trade policy are illustrated by the ill-fated 
attempt to establish a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) by the OECD in 
1998 (Kobrin, 1998). NAFTA’s Chapter 11 provisions on investment have also drawn 
considerable criticism and concern. Social regulations – including policy issues 
associated with food safety and environmental protection as well as cultural issues 
(Isaac, 2002; Spriggs and Isaac, 2001) – have made a controversial appearance on the 
trade agenda as the Canada-U.S. challenge to the WTO regarding the EU ban on 
hormone-treated beef illustrates. In fact, the EU response to ignore the WTO decision 
against its ban clearly indicates that when trade concerns and social regulatory issues 
conflict, the “winner” is not the international trading regime, as the EU enjoys 
considerable public support in its defiance of the WTO decision (Spriggs and Isaac, 
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2001). Looking ahead, transatlantic differences in social regulations applied to 
products of biotechnology (e.g., genetically modified crops) have led to market access 
difficulties for North American products that appear to contravene the rights and 
obligations outlined in the WTO Agreements (Isaac, 2002). Trade policy issues are no 
longer just border measures; instead, the vastly complex issues of divergent social 
regulations are now part of the trade policy agenda.
2 
If the domestication of complex trade policy issues was predictable, what has not 
been predictable is the enthusiasm with which the demands for greater openness in 
trade policy development have been made, exemplified by the protests at the World 
Trade Organization’s 1999 Ministerial Meeting in Seattle and the April 2001 Summit 
negotiations of the Free Trade Area of the Americas in Quebec City. If other policy 
areas are also facing demands for greater openness why has trade policy been targeted 
especially vehemently?  
The short answer is that trade policy development processes have not traditionally 
been open and therefore have tended to lack any codified channels for access. There 
was a dual purpose for this: (1) to allow for the requisite trade-offs necessary to reach 
agreement; and (2) as a governance function to prevent “protectionist” interests from 
capturing trade policy in a way that maximizes the gains for a few at the expense of 
many. Considerable effort was made to keep trade policy development – and 
especially negotiation and decision making – independent of such protectionist 
interests. The remedy was closed-door economic diplomacy where policy analysis 
calculations measured “social welfare” (i.e., consumer surplus) and other metrics of 
the economy-wide impacts of trade liberalization instead of sector-specific 
calculations (Stairs, 2000; McCormick, 1998). Chairs at the negotiating table were 
reserved for high-ranking national officials and market access negotiations involved 
tariff-swapping forms of reciprocity, while subsequent implementation of the agreed 
market liberalization policies was left as a bureaucratic function. This closed-door 
nature of trade policy – practised by all trading nations – is often credited with 
facilitating trade liberalization (Hay, 2000; Wolfe, 2000; Stairs, 2000; McCormick, 
1998).   
Yet ironically, it is this closed-door nature that reinforces a simple but particularly 
incisive criticism of trade policy: that the “domestication” of increasingly complex 
trade issues means that trade policy now reaches deep into policy areas traditionally 
under national competence, constraining domestic policy options, while remaining 
unaccountable to the affected constituents – the so-called democratic deficit of trade 
policy. Leading the openness demands – on behalf of citizens – have been various 
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non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or civil society organizations (CSOs) such 
as consumer, environmental and social development interest groups (including labour 
unions as well as religious groups like Christian Aid).
3 What sets these groups apart 
from traditional trade policy actors such as industry associations
4 is that when these 
groups feel that not enough has been done to incorporate their belief structures they 
are willing to take action to actually subvert the trade policy system (while industry 




hile the “domestication” of increasingly complicated trade issues presents 
compelling reasons for the increased openness of trade policy development in 
general, there is very little guidance on how to specifically operationalize openness 
(i.e., what exactly is openness?; at what stage of the trade policy development process 
should there be greater openness?; which non-state actors should be permitted to 
participate?). Establishing an openness framework allows for not only an 
identification of the range of debates associated with increasing trade policy openness 
and, consequently the range of decisions that a jurisdiction must make, but also a 
meaningful characterization of jurisdictions according to the openness initiatives 
undertaken.  
In order to better understand trade policy openness and its operationalization, a 
framework – composed of four openness comparators: depth, structure, timing, and 
accreditation – is presented in table 1). Each of these openness comparators is 
discussed below.  
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  Transparency   - one-way flow of information  




  A.    Institutional    - formalized openness 
procedures  
          Discretionary   - ad hoc, flexible openness 
procedures  
    
  B.    Political service   - elected officials  




  1.    Policy development   - legislative stage  
  2.    Negotiation  
       - issues formulation 
       - policy position  
       - debriefing  
- administrative stage 
  3.    Implementation/transposition   - administrative stage  




  A.    National   - organization must have 
national orientation  
          International   - organization must have 
international orientation  
    
  B.    Representivity   - organization must be 
representative of public interest  
          Policy expertise   - organization must have 
demonstrable expertise  
          Broad input   - any organization  
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Depth of Openness  
There are two aspects of the term openness when applied to public policy – 
transparency and participation (Enders, 1997; International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, 1994; Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations, 1980). The 
former refers to the one-way flow of information from the competent policy authority 
to the general public including, for instance, distribution of official policy papers and 
debriefings of relevant policy positions. The latter refers to the degree to which 
citizens may be involved in the trade policy advisory system not only through direct 
consultation (Hay, 2000) but also through involvement in decision-making functions 
(Simmons, 1998; Enders, 1997; Najam, 1996). Essentially, participation deepens the 
meaning of openness to include a two-way flow of information between the 
competent policy authorities and citizens.  
 
Structure of Openness 
There are two dimensions of openness structure to consider. First, should it be an 
institutional structure formalized in regulations and statutory obligations or should it 
be an informal, discretionary structure providing transparency and/or participation on 
an ad hoc basis in response to public controversy? Second, should openness in trade 
policy development be accomplished through the political service or the public 
service? These two dimensions are examined below.  
Institutional v. Discretionary Structure of Openness  
There are important trade-offs to consider between an institutional structure and a 
discretionary structure of openness. A formal institutional structure may build 
credibility and legitimacy in its permanence and certainty in its operation and, in the 
long-term, institutional openness is supportive of democratic principles (Stairs, 2000). 
Yet the U.S. experience with securing fast-track negotiating authority reveals how 
crippling an institutional structure can be for trade policy when the structure becomes 
highly politicized (Scherlen, 1998). Also, it has been argued that institutional 
openness requires a formal overarching policy for a strategic openness framework to 
facilitate essentially equal openness across all trade policy issues (Hay, 2000). On the 
other hand, a discretionary structure may be very flexible and allow policy makers to 
deal with issues on a case-by-case basis. That is, discretionary openness can be 
responsive to public concern (when there is public concern, greater openness is 
provided; otherwise it is business as usual) although Hay (2000 at 7) argues that 
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discretionary structure should not be thought of simply as “reactive exercises in risk 
avoidance and damage control”. Supporters of a discretionary structure tend to argue 
that the process of openness is secondary to the product or outcome of openness; as 
long as the lasting relationships of policy influence are established it really does not 
matter what mechanisms or processes have been used to achieve this outcome (Hay, 
2000). Yet the lack of formal, institutional obligations may not build policy credibility 
and legitimacy if concerns remain that there is no real mechanism for addressing the 
demand for increased openness and that a “behind-the-scenes” structure of openness 
may, in fact, be more susceptible to capture. Moreover, it has been asserted that 
support for hot issues dealt with in an informal, discretionary way is “insidiously 
corrosive of the democratic principle” (Stairs, 2000 at 38).  
Not all agree that the choice between the two types of structure is a discrete one; 
instead it is argued that a middle ground is needed between institutional and 
discretionary structures, where the goal must be to develop “formal but flexible 
systems…to foster dynamism and self-adjustment” (Simmons, 1998 at 92). In 
addition, it has been asserted that a causal relationship exists between the two where 
informal structures emerge, giving rise to formal structures if required
5. Of course, a 
concern remains that as formal structures emerge over time they grant privileged 
access to the trade policy advisory system to those non-state actors involved since the 
beginning, and the same level of access is not provided to new actors (Stairs, 2000).  
Political v. Public Structure of Openness  
The second dimension of structure is associated with the branch of government 
where the openness is provided: among either the political service (elected officials) 
or the public service (bureaucracy) (Stairs, 2000). In the former, openness represents 
access for non-state actors to legislators charged with establishing the fundamental 
policy frameworks. This can be through, for instance, hearings and other public 
consultation mechanisms. In the latter, openness represents access for non-state actors 
to the bureaucrats charged with initiating policies in the first instance or adding the 
detail to the broad policy framework established by the political service. This can be 
through high-level meetings with public officials.  
It has been argued that there is an intuitive consistency between the choices of 
discretionary versus institutional and political versus public service structures of 
openness, where the preferred structure, from the perspective of the preservation of 
the democratic principle, is institutional openness emerging from the political service 
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as a result of public advisory mechanisms rather than discretionary openness targeting 
the public sector “behind the scenes” (Stairs, 2000). 
 
Timing of Openness 
 Another complex issue to deal with is the timing of the openness relative to the 
trade policy development process; at which stage in the process should there be 
increased citizen engagement?
6   
There are four stages in the trade policy advisory system where greater openness 
may be granted. The first stage, a legislative stage (Stairs, 2000), is where the broad-
framework trade policy is established, for instance a national commitment to the 
liberalization of international trade through the WTO. The second stage is the 
administrative negotiation stage undertaken within the context of the framework 
policy and composed of three sub-stages: 1) issues formulation, where the negotiating 
parameters are established; 2) the development of a trade policy position, where the 
national position is iteratively developed through the process of consultation and 
negotiation; and 3) the debriefing, where the results of negotiations are made public.
7 
The third stage is the administrative policy implementation or transposition stage, 
where the negotiated positions are ratified and incorporated in domestic policies and 
legislation. Finally, the fourth stage is the policy review stage, which returns the trade 
policy advisory system back to a legislative stage. Here the various trade policies are 
reviewed through public consultations, and necessary changes to the framework 
principles are made.  
There is significant disagreement as to where greater openness or citizen 
engagement should occur. One perspective holds that this is a linear process that 
evolves through the legislative and administrative stages sequentially. At the 
legislative stage routine public consultation and citizen engagement with the political 
service must occur (Hay, 2000). Once the framework policy has been established there 
is no room for further discussion about the framework; attention must now be paid to 
the policy detail developed by the public service within this broad policy framework 
(Wolfe, 2000).
8 According to this view, the feedback mechanisms between the 
legislative (political service) and the administrative (public service) functions of the 
system occur linearly and there should be little opportunity for deviation from this 
path. Of course, an alternative view is that this should not be a linear process. It has 
been argued, instead, that citizens have the right to consult on framework principles at 
any stage of the trade policy advisory system and not just during the initial legislative 
stages (Shamsie, 2000). Similarly, it has been noted that framework policies are never 
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solid enough to assume away any further development before the next legislative 
opportunity for policy review (Hay, 2000). In fact, it has been noted that the failure of 
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment essentially proved that citizen engagement 
can bend the system back onto itself: “the wave of protest elevated the question of the 
MAI from the ‘level of civil servants’ [administrative stage] to the ‘ministerial level’ 
[legislative stage]” (Kobrin, 1998 at 99). Certainly, when efforts to change over-
arching framework policies regarding societal norms are aimed at the legislative stage 
there is sure to be difficulty (Simmons, 1998).  
While all jurisdictions eventually draw the line (there comes a point in the 
intergovernmental negotiation procedure when only state-actors are “at the table”) a 
problem arises when the line is drawn at different locations by different jurisdictions.
9 
The traditional perspective holds that because international trade negotiations are 
intergovernmental activities, they require some degree of international diplomacy, and 
adding more complexity through greater openness will only serve to hinder, not help, 
agreement. Indeed, because agreements made at this point are simply agreements in 
principle within the policy framework previously established and will still require 
domestic ratification and transposition, it is argued that openness is unnecessary 
(Wolfe, 2000).  
Of course, there is disagreement with this view (Shamsie, 2000). A 1999 
recommendation by the Canadian Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade specifically insisted on greater openness during the actual 
negotiation process. From this perspective, there is concern that while input into the 
trade policy framework is good, the real problem lies at the negotiating table where 
trade-offs have to be made; implying that openness only before and after but not 
during negotiations is unacceptable.  
 
Accreditation  
Undoubtedly the most controversial comparator deals with the accreditation of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to participate in the trade policy advisory 
system (Simmons, 1998; Najam, 1996)
10. The basis for the demands made by various 
NGOs for greater openness of the trade policy advisory system is that they represent 
the interests of “citizens”. This belief has given rise to what has been termed an 
associational revolution (Salamon, 1994). For instance, commercial NGOs – such as 
industry associations – often claim to represent the public interest in the trade policy 
advisory system by supporting trade liberalization that increases economic 
development and growth, increasing incomes and allowing for higher levels of 
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income-elastic social regulations; a regulatory race to the top. Inversely, many civil 
society NGOs – such as environmental or consumer organizations – often claim to 
represent the public interest in the trade policy advisory system by trying to constrain 
trade liberalization, albeit to achieve different outcomes.
11  
The claim that NGOs represent “citizens” is subject to the problem of aggregation 
– is openness in the trade policy advisory system for NGOs necessarily the same thing 
as openness in the system for all interested/concerned citizens? There exists 
widespread agreement that the solution to the problem of aggregation is that only 
NGOs with requisite legitimacy and accountability deserve accreditation (Shamsie, 
2000; Simmons, 1998; Najam, 1996; Clark, 1991). Several characteristics have been 
identified. One important characteristic that makes NGOs well suited to effectively 
represent citizens is their “institutional memory” providing continuity to the policy 
advisory system (Hay, 2000). Also, the well-organized enthusiastic members of these 
organizations share a belief system, such as the environmental movement’s belief in 
the holistic beneficence of organic agricultural production or a social development 
organization’s particular religious perspective, giving the NGOs tremendous strength 
of purpose (Najam, 1996).  
Conversely, there are many arguments that caution against an increased role of 
non-state organizations on behalf of citizens. It has been argued that NGOs are often 
unstable in their mission, which is easily swayed in the pursuit of attention (Tendler, 
1982). In fact, it has been argued that the rise of “campaignism” by these groups 
illustrates this (Najam, 1996). Others have argued that most NGOs are neither 
democratic (legitimate) nor accountable to the people they claim to represent 
(Simmons, 1998). International NGOs have been blamed for practising the very same 
“globalization” that multinational corporations have been accused of: international 
forces unaccountable to the domestic constituents, reaching deep into national policy 
competence and constraining the available policy options. For instance, it has been 
warned that the policy control of international NGOs risks a new wave of “neo-
colonialism” (Najam, 1996). Others have argued that in many cases national NGOs 
are simply branch plants of international NGOs, raising serious concerns about the 
degree to which they represent domestic citizens (Stairs, 2000). Similarly, Kobrin 
(1998 at 99) has argued that international NGOs compromise “the concept of national 
sovereignty and local control” over policies and concluded that “an electronically 
integrated global civil society and a global economy are two sides of the same coin”. 
Further, it has been argued that belief systems and policy development are not often 
congruent, because the former are not open to compromise or concession (Akerlof and 
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Dickens, 1982) while compromise and concession are two important and necessary 
aspects of any policy development.   
In short, the issue of accrediting NGOs is both controversial and far from 
resolved. There are two dimensions to consider. First, the questions of national versus 
international accreditation involves the concern that national governments negotiating 
in their own economic interests and national NGOs focused only on domestic issues 
may collectively fail to deal with real international externalities; hence accreditation 
must also go to those international NGOs focused on international externalities to 
ensure that the various national policy positions do not neglect these issues.  
The second accreditation dimension to consider is which groups might be granted 
access according to the three identified goals of accreditation: representativeness; 
policy expertise; and broad input. Accreditation for representativeness would be 
awarded to those NGOs with a membership that can be demonstrated to represent a 
significant portion of the public interest. Of course, this type of accreditation would be 
biased in favour of large membership groups and criteria for representativeness would 
have to be established. Policy-expertise accreditation would be awarded to those 
NGOs that can demonstrate that they possess a significant degree of expertise about a 
particular policy issue or issues through, for instance, past publications, advocacy 
work and participation on various boards and advisory committees. While it may be 
assumed that large membership groups would have a budget sufficient enough to 
dedicate personnel to particular files and thus would be awarded accreditation, there 
would not be a large-group bias because small, expert-based groups focused on a 
single file would also have access. Finally, broad-input accreditation would be 
awarded to any NGO, as the goal is to identify the complete range of policy 
perspectives regardless of, say, representativeness and/or policy expertise. Certainly, 
while this approach seems the most democratic, there would likely be large time and 
cost commitments which would then raise the need for more streamlined criteria such 




hile in general it is hard to argue against increased openness of the trade policy 
development process, operationalizing openness is a complex and challenging 
undertaking. The ambiguity of how and when openness is actually permitted can be 
removed and the openness initiatives of various jurisdictions can be characterized by 
referring to the openness framework, its comparators and their dimensions.  
tions for Trade Policy 
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The central implication the openness framework has for trade policy is captured in 
the concept of openness sovereignty; that is, the mechanisms for openness are a 
“bottom-up” function of domestic factors such that there is no universal model of 
openness. Instead, different jurisdictions will undertake openness initiatives with 
varying depth, structure, timing and accreditation comparators. It can be expected that, 
so long as jurisdictions differ in the openness they provide, actual openness at the 
international level (i.e., at the WTO or the FTAA) will be subject to the lowest-
common-denominator phenomenon; actual openness will match the openness of the 
least open jurisdiction.   
Finally, while it may seem obvious that openness is sovereign rather than 
universal, this concept challenges the efforts of some international NGOs who 
prescribe  openness globalization – particular openness mechanisms for all 
jurisdictions despite domestic factors.  
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Endnotes 
                                                       
1.  The term openness will be fully specified in the section “Openness Framework” 
below.   
2.  This is not to imply that trade policy should not deal with such issues when they 
are the basis for market access difficulties. Indeed, it must be remembered that 
these issues are now on the trade agenda because trade policy has been extremely 
successful in bridging international differences in market access rules for border 
measures. As most border measures have been eliminated, to acquire further 
benefits from trade liberalization will require the “deepening” of international 
economic relations that is entailed in the removal of non-border impediments to 
commercial transactions. Given the proven record of economic benefits that have 
followed past liberalization efforts, it is easy to conclude that trade policy should 
press ahead and deal with new emerging market access issues.  
3.  Salamon (1995 at 243) refers to this phenomenon as an “associational revolution” 
at the international policy stage and argues that this associational revolution is 
perhaps as important in social and political terms as the rise of the nation-state 
was in the latter 19th century. See also Simmons (1998), who argued that such 
organizations have increasingly been involved in setting policy agendas and 
negotiating policy positions, and their involvement confers legitimacy on the 
policy outcomes. 
4.  Industry associations include horizontal and vertical associations of manufacturers 
and service providers as well as groups representing various sectors, such as 
farmers’ unions.  
5.  See Stairs (2000), who suggests that Canadian efforts at increasing citizen 
engagement in foreign policy in the 1970s were based first on an ad hoc or 
discretionary approach.  
6.  Recent anti-trade protests such as Seattle (November 1999) and Quebec City (April 
2001) have targeted the actual negotiation stage, but is this the optimal stage at 
which to seek to influence trade policy? 
7.  Hay (2000) argues that such measures dispel rumours about the negotiated 
positions and build trust among those briefed.  
8.  See also Hart, Dymond and Robertson (1994) who argued that the legislative 
debates on framework policy prior to the negotiation stage revealed the policy 
framework that had “won” and subsequent negotiations should be an 
administrative task within this framework.  
9.  Consider two countries, A and B. If non-state actors in A are privy to information 
regarding the negotiations between A and B that non-state actors in B are not 
privy to (for domestic institutional reasons in B), how can the non-state actors in 
A be prevented from informing the non-state actors in B and thus circumventing 
the openness model in B? Similar difficulties of coordination can be identified and 
all result in the situation that the governmental negotiations become captured by 
concerns that are secondary to the actual negotiation task at hand.  
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10.  In fact, Simmons (1998) argues that the issue of accreditation is at the “limits of 
democracy”.  
11.  Consumer, environmental and social development organizations are not a 
homogeneous group sharing the same concerns about trade policy. For instance, 
consumer organizations have long supported efforts at liberalizing trade because 
of the consumer benefits. Recently, however, their support has been qualified; 
they support trade liberalization but not at the expense of high standards for social 
regulations. In other words, consumer organizations tend to support trade 
liberalization efforts provided that domestic regulations are not forced downward; 
the so-called regulatory race to the bottom (Drache, 1996). These groups demand 
more openness in the form of transparency – to ensure that domestic regulations 
are not traded-off against foreign market access – and in the form of participation 
– to ensure a consultative role in the development of trade policy and in the 
implementation of negotiated market access rules. Often, however, these 
organizations do not demand involvement in the actual process of negotiation. 
Yet, unlike consumer organizations, environmental and social development 
organizations do not face the challenge of balancing commercial and social 
interests. Environmental groups’ concern with the international trading system is 
that this system does not account for environmental protection objectives. Of 
course, they are right. The WTO’s Committee on Trade and the Environment 
recently noted that indeed it does not account for environmental protection 
objectives because it should not; increasing market access for traded products is 
its only mandate (WTO, 1999a). Yet, unsatisfied with this explanation, 
environmental organizations demand openness in the form of transparency – to 
ensure that environmental objectives are not subordinated to market access 
concerns in the development of trade policy and during negotiations (which of 
course they are) – and participation in the form of involvement in the trade policy 
development and negotiation process in order to ensure that environmental 
externalities are not forgotten when countries negotiate market access rules in 
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